Over 40 Years on the Brink of a War
Time has witnessed countless events that changed the course of history, World War II being one of them, if not the most significant, especially in the field of diplomatic history. The aftermath of World War II witnessed a number of occurrences, such as new international organizations, establishment of global institutions, and even foundation of new nation states. One of the emergences of post-war period was a rather less tangible event, i.e., the Cold War. The Cold War was essentially an almost 40-year-long period of competition between two superpowers, United States and the Soviet Union, during which diplomatic disputes, conflicts of ideological and economic interest, and race for technological and military supremacy arose (Deighton, 1996, p. 81-82). Regarding the cause of the Cold War, there are three schools of thought according to historians and scholars, namely traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist views. It is important to note that the underlying cause for the difference between the three approaches is their justifications, which will be further illustrated in the following paragraphs.
According to the traditionalist point of view, the driving force of the Cold War was the ideological conflict of the two superpowers. The end of World War II left numerous continental European states under the patronage of the Soviet Union, especially states in Eastern Europe such as Poland and east part of Germany, later to be coined as East Germany. Other than its influence on Eastern Europe and already existing states such as today’s Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and other nations, the Soviet Union had the desire to expand the influence of the Communist ideology, which was the fundamental concern of the United States, where a capitalism economy was dominant. The Communist ideology necessitated a closed economy where the production process and means were under the control of the state, whereas capitalism defended a global market economy, based on individual ownership of means of production. Moreover, Deighton demonstrates Stalin’s unrestful approach towards the post-war period as follows:
“Stalin’s Soviet Union was no ‘ordinary’ state, but a rogue, totalitarian state with which it was impossible to do normal diplomatic business. The particularly distasteful character of its leader combined with Communist ideology, which preached that the eventual collapse of capitalism and the triumph of socialism was historically inevitable, to entrench this view… Soviet behaviour indicated a ‘forward’, aggressive stance which would undermine the status quo and lose it the goodwill of its former allies.” (Deighton, 1996, p. 84).
Deighton’s words vividly depict the aggressive and expansive perspective of the Soviet Union towards diplomatic relations, hence justifying the threat of the situations for United States. J. L. Gaddis further supports this claim as follows: “Stalin’s goal, therefore, was not to restore the balance of power in Europe, but rather to dominate that continent as thoroughly as Hitler had sought to do,” (Gaddis, 2007, p. 14). In other words, the traditionalist approach portrays the emergence of Cold War as a defence mechanism of the US from the Soviet expansionist foreign policies, for its own interests.
In the late 1960s and 1970s a rather opposing view of emergence of Cold War occurred, namely the revisionist school of thought. While the traditionalist perspective revolved around Soviet expansionist ideology, the revisionist perspective set forward the US foreign policy as the peace undermining reason. In fact, according to this view, United States undertook a variety of military developments and diplomatic alliances, legitimizing their actions with the “communist expansion” myth, portraying communism as a threat for developing nations across the globe. Throughout the course of over 40 years of the Cold War, the United States interfered with armed conflicts in nations such as Korea and Vietnam. Although these conflicts were not directly with the Soviet Union, they were against a possible rising of a communist regime in the far east. Anne Deighton develops this argument by referencing D. W. Larson, an established political scientist, as follows:
“She (Larson) paints convincing portraits of the contrasting world-views of Byrnes, Acheson, and Truman which reveal their different perceptions of the Soviet Union and shows how these influenced particular policy outcomes. She argues that many historians have imposed retrospectively and inaccurately a coherence on the American foreign policy that did not exist at the time.” (Deighton, 1996, p. 87).
The concern at the time was not only that communism would eradicate the US’ desire of a global market economy, but also the perceived resemblance between totalitarian USSR communist regime and the Nazi totalitarianism. In fact, president Truman (1945-53) stated that ‘A totalitarian state is no different whether you call it Nazi, Fascist, Communist or Franco Spain’ (Deighton, 1996, p. 87). Hence, there was a conspicuously marginalising attitude towards communism and its mythicised threat by the Western bloc.
During the late 1970s a considerably new explanation emerged as to why the Cold War had outbroke. The post-revisionist school of thought rejected the faultiness of both superpowers – which the revisionist and traditionalist views defended – alternatively proposing that it was the characteristic of the international structure in the aftermath of World War II that led to Cold War. Prior to World War II, power structure in world politics was rather different. Neither the US nor the USSR had an outstanding power in the world arena, which changed drastically after 1945. To some extent, the transformation of international system from a multipolar state to a bipolar state was inevitable, and therefore neither of the two superpowers, i.e., the US and the USSR, had no intentions of giving up the opportunity of becoming one bloc of the new bipolar system, as it would mean that another state would take that opportunity. Two similarly consequential incidents that occurred in the early year of the Cold War were the telegraphs written by the diplomats of the two nations. According to Gaddis, the famous ‘X’ signed telegraph by the US diplomat G. F. Kennan – stating the horrific intentions of the Soviet Union – was the main trigger for initiation of anti-communist foreign policies by US. In the USSR, on the other hand, similarly, ambassador Novikov stated that “The foreign policy of the United States reflects the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism, [and] is characterised… by a striving for world supremacy,” (Gaddis, 2007, p. 30). This strengthened the tension, but was a situation that occurred out of the control of both superpowers.
The emergence of the Cold War depended on a number of factors, ranging from the international political system, to the role that individuals played in intentionally or unintentionally manipulating both superpowers into applying menacing foreign policies. The three main approaches towards the subject matter are traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist school of thought. While traditionalist and revisionist perspectives demonstrate rather sided arguments as to what initiated the Cold War, post-revisionist perspective concentrates on the naturality of the occurrence of such a long-lasting event, a process in which both states had no direct control over. The righteousness of all three perspectives, or either one of the perspectives necessitates a lot more determined and focused research, as well as well-constructed argumentation. Even then, a definitive answer may be difficult to acquire – if not impossible.
Bibliography
1-Gaddis, J. L. (2007). Chapter 1. In The Cold War: A New History (pp. 5–46). essay, Penguin Books.
2-Woods, N., & Deighton, A. (1996). In Explaining international relations since 1945 (pp. 81–97). essay, Oxford University Press.
Photo: https://shirvangomezboland.wordpress.com/political-cartoons-from-the-1960s-and-1970s/